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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Banking and Finance at the 
International Hellenic University.  
This study examines a sample of 47 private firms in Australia and New Zealand that 
chose to go public through a reverse takeover (RTs) transaction. The proposed 
dissertation aims at exploring the wealth effects of such transactions in Australia and 
New Zealand which have recently experienced an unprecedented wave of RTs. 
Especially, the current study is going to examine the main reasons of going public via 
a reverse takeover in the Australian and New Zealand’s market for 47 reverse 
takeovers that took place between 1993 and 2014. Another task of the study is to 
unveil the main characteristics of reverse takeovers, the benefits and costs for a firm 
going public this way and the post-merger operating performance of the new entity. 
Reverse takeover is a process that allows a private company to go public by acquiring 
a public one. When the transaction is completed, the new merged company usually 
operates under the management of the private-target company. Furthermore, the 
public company undertakes the target’s name in order to operate as a new entity 
after the merger. The public company is most of the times a poor performer or a 
non-operating shell which chooses to undertake a RT process in order to improve its 
future performance. It has been observed that there are significant gains for the 
shareholders during a short term period around the event, but in the long run, the 
post-merger performance seems weak. Though the RT process is considered to be a 
cheaper and less time consuming method compared with an IPO, it appears to be 
risky, if one takes into consideration the long-term performance of the merged 
entity. After analyzing our sample we concluded that the announcement of an RT 
generates abnormal returns which seem to increase the wealth of the shareholders. 
The investors’ reaction is more slow when compared to the results of other studies 
but this can be due to the information asymmetry that characterizes the companies 
we examine. The post-merger performance analysis gave also good results, showing 
that even though the firms do grow in size after the merger, they do not grow in 
financial matters at the desired levels. Some of them do not survive as well.  
 
Makantasi Maria Irene 
October 2015 
 
Keywords: Reverse Takeovers; RTs; Australia and New Zealand; going public. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In the last two decades reverse takeovers (RTs) are alleged to outnumber of 
traditional Initial Public Offering (IPOs) as an alternative mechanism to go public. The 
reason for this fact is that the IPO process is considered to be very expensive, due to 
the high registration fees as well as the underwriting and other hidden expenses. 
Because of the fact of being such a time consuming process, IPO seems that has 
begun to lose its “reputation” as the preferred mechanism to go public. 
Notwithstanding their growing popularity, the wealth effects of RT announcements 
are relatively under researched especially in the Australasian region. The Reverse 
Takeover process refers to the technique where a private firm wants to go public 
without undertaking the high registration and underwriting fees of an IPO process. 
Those private firms are usually small, young and most of the times do not meet the 
listing criteria, so they choose an alternative way to go public, such as a Reverse 
Takeover. RT is a back door of going public because the private company is acquired 
by a listed “shell” company in order to obtain the public listing. The shell company 
has motivations in order to undertake this process as well. This kind of companies 
usually have no assets or operations prior to the takeover, so they expect that 
through the merger they will recover their operations and start grow again. Also, it is 
a good opportunity for the shareholders to recover some of the losses that occurred 
by investing in the shell company. The RT is called Reverse because the new entity 
which is formed after the merger is based on the private company-the target. The 
academic interest is concentrated on the companies’ motivation and the 
understanding of going public this way, the quality and viability of the new entities 
as well as the post-performance of the entities after the merger.  
Every year RTs seem to gain more popularity as an alternative way to go public. 
Lately, more and more researches have been conducted in order to answer 
significant questions, such as 
 What are the main reasons that companies choose Reverse Takeovers to go 
public rather than an IPO or another mechanism.  
  In what way Reverse Takeovers create wealth effects for the shareholders of 
the public entity.  
  What is the post-merger operating performance of the new entity.  
The current study aims to answer these questions using data from Australia and New 
Zealand. For that reason, a sample of 47 RTs that took place in these countries from 
1993 to 2014 was created.  
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Little research has been conducted in order to examine the value relevance of RTs in 
the Australian region (see Brown et al. (2010), so we believe that this study will fill 
the gap and it will be of the best interest of shareholders, researchers and policy 
makers as well. 
The structure of our study is as follows: In Chapter 2 we review the literature and the 
studies that have been conducted until recently. Chapter 3 is a description of the 
process of RTs and their regulation as well, the characteristics and the motivations pf 
the firms that chose this process and an Australian case as well. In Chapter 4 we 
provide a description of our data collections, In Chapter 5 we present the 
methodology used in order to draw conclusions. Chapter 6 is an analysis of the 
empirical results and finally in Chapter 7 we provide our conclusions and 
recommendations.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
In the early stages of a company’s operations, capital is the necessary fuel which is 
provided usually from a small number of investors. Most of the times, when the 
business cycle gets larger, the company needs more capital in order to expand its 
operations and be competitive, so the next step is to sell shares in a larger number of 
investors and a way to do that is to go public.  
Going public has advantages and disadvantages as well. It may strengthens the 
capital base, make a potential acquisition easier, diversify the ownership and 
increase the prestige and reputation of the company, but it increases costs, it forces 
disclosure to the public and imposes restrictions on management as well. Arellano et 
al. (2002) suggest that the IPO process is chosen by high quality firms whereas the 
low quality companies prefer the RT method. This explains the significant percentage 
of delisted firms after an RT, (32.6%), in the U.S. stock exchange between 1990 and 
2000. RT companies are those that did not fulfill any initial listing requirement or 
continued listing requirements implying that most of these companies are low 
quality firms which should not be listed. In a previous study, Gleason et al. (2003) 
investigated a big sample of firms in order to examine special characteristics that 
contribute to a reverse takeover to take place. Among their conclusions, 
management and the financial position of the private firm are the most common 
reasons for a company to participate in a RT. They also claimed that even though the 
public firm prior to the announcement of the RT is usually a poor performance firm, 
after the announcement the shareholders receive significant wealth gains. In 
contrast, after two years of the merger, there is no significant improvement in the 
financial and profitability position of the new entity.  
Gleason et al. (2005) describes the public status of a firm as the ability to gain access 
to capital markets, increase their liquidity and the owners have the possibility to 
diversify their holdings. A big drawback of the IPO process is the significant costs that 
are associated with this process. The direct costs are considered to be the 
underwriting, auditing and legal costs, whereas the indirect are the increased 
disclosure requirements and all the management effort needed to conduct this 
procedure, (Ritter, 1998). Gleason et al. (2005) investigated the characteristics and 
motivation of firms that choose the reverse takeover method and the short and long 
stock price performance after the reverse takeover transaction. They employed a 
sample of 121 listed in NYSE NASDAQ and AMEX. The authors tried to unveil a 
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hidden relationship between the industry market of the shell company and the 
private company in order to go dipper into the RT process. They concluded that the 
RT is more beneficial for firms which are trying to recover a part of their investments 
and for distressed firms as well. But despite the fact that the authors found 
significantly positive abnormal returns on the RT announcement period (one day 
prior to the event and one day after), the post-merger performance not only does 
not seem to be improved but also, only a 46% of the sample firms seem to survive 
two years after the event. They also concluded the motivation of the private 
companies choosing to go public through RTs, is the opportunities of growth and the 
expansion of their current operations in related or different industry sectors.  
The level of information asymmetry is negatively related to the firm size (Aydoglou 
et al., 2007) meaning that a small-sized firm is more likely to reject the IPO process in 
order to go public and prefer an alternative one, such as the RT process. Poulsen and 
Stegemoller (2008) compared outright sell-outs to IPOs and found that another 
characteristic of the firms that are more possibly to select an alternative process to 
the IPO is the high information asymmetry. Aydoglou et al. (2007) tried to uncover 
any unusual trading behavior surrounding reverse mergers via trading activity 
analysis. They found sporadic and statistically significant positive returns surrounding 
the reverse merger reflecting the increase in value of the shell companies. The 
positive CARs following reverse merger announcements supported the initial 
findings. Asquith and Rock (2011) focused on the reasons that a company should 
choose between an IPO and a RT process to go public. The authors compared the 
two methods on a yearly basis and analyzed the 3-Day Excess stock return and the 3-
Day Excess trading volume. They observed that excess returns for the bidding firm, 
which is 21.8%, were similar to the excess returns of the firms completing an IPO, so 
they concluded that, since the shareholders retain a large percentage of their stock 
once the merger is completed, the RTO process can be served as an alternative of 
the IPO process, with no extreme differences characterizing the two mechanisms. 
Gleason et al. (2008) found that the firms opted for going public via RTs  have a very 
low ROA in the year of the transaction, but in comparison with firms that chose the 
IPO process, they have no difference in ROE. The most common characteristic of the 
firms employing RTs is the significantly low balance sheet liquidity, the likelihood of 
financial distress and greater financial leverage. By examining the post going public 
market performance, Gleason et al. (2008) found that the firms using alternative 
methods to go public, such as RTs, outperform the firms that chose the traditional 
method of IPOs in the short term. In the long term, they seem to be very volatile, 
have lower liquidity and lower institutional participation than their matched 
traditional IPO counterparts. 
Sjostrom (2008) sees RTs as a way to open the door to Private Investments in Public 
Equity (PIPEs) for private companies that have limited alternative funding options. 
He found that even though RTs are cheaper and quicker than the traditional IPO 
process, the end results, not only in financial matters, between a company that 
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chooses an RT and a company that chooses an IPO are not comparable. The firms 
that choose the RT process seem to be significantly less profitable, having 
significantly lower balance sheet liquidity, and having significantly more leverage 
than comparable IPO firms in the year they went public. So he concluded that the 
RM process allows companies to go public even though when they cannot secure the 
support of underwriters. Carpentier et al. (2009) tested whether regulation and 
disclosure have a significant impact on the value and the long-term performance of 
the companies that go public. In order to achieve that, they tested a sample of 1,455 
Canadian RTs and IPOs from 1993 to 2003. They also found that due to the listing 
requirements, the shareholders’ wealth declines and the performance of the RTs is 
poor compared to the corresponding IPOs. 
Prior evidence has shown that public firms involved in a reverse takeover are 
unprofitable ones with little or none of real business activity. Floros and Sapp (2011) 
examined the value that a shell firm brings to a private company in the case where 
investors in trading shell companies earn a positive return over time. Their sample 
consisted of 585 shell companies. The main question was how these firms that have 
no systematic risk, assets and operation still have investors for their shares which 
have a declining value over time. They found that these firms have three-month 
abnormal returns of 48.1 % which appears to be a compensation for the illiquidity 
and the uncertainty that accompanies the reverse takeover process. The shell 
companies’ returns at the integration of a reverse merger are much greater than 
those of a similar company. In a previous study, Floros and Shastri (2010) argued 
that RTs cannot be considered an alternative to IPOs as they are smaller. So, they 
compared RTs to PSIPOS- penny stock Initial Public Offerings- as these are thought to 
be more comparable than IPOs.  They concluded that RTs may be an alternative way 
to go public for firms that have low profitability, low liquidity, highly information 
asymmetric and are in a primary stage of development and need to invest more in 
R&D.  These companies do not choose the PSIPO path in order to go public because 
of the large discount of their stock price and the misevaluation and ignorance from 
the investors as a result of the high information asymmetry that surrounds them. 
Semenenko (2011) examined the timing that firms decide to go public and concluded 
that when markets are unfavorable, small firms decide to merge with financially 
distressed firms. But in the case of RTs the companies have a more strategical 
behavior, as they time the market when they merge with publicly traded firms and 
sell overvalued capital to their investors. In both studies of Semenenko (2011) and 
Ojha et al. (2013) the conclusion was that RTs are becoming more favorable for the 
firms that want to go public because they are time and money savers, but they are 
becoming a source of big frauds, as many firms tried to get themselves in the US 
stock exchange via this way. This is the reason why SEC changed the rules to more 
restricted laws in order to ensure a good function of the RT process.  
When choosing between RTs and IPOs, the anticipation of insider transactions is 
another consideration (LoSardo and Zhu, 2012). It is accepted that insider 
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shareholders can sell their shares more easily after an RTO transaction, since it is a 
merger. On the other hand, according to Brau et al. (2003), the insiders who sell a 
large amount of their shares during the IPO process, send a signal that the company 
is overvalued. This kind of misleading negative information is less likely to spread 
during an RT because the acquiring firms might face fewer information asymmetries 
relating to the target firm’s value. 
The RT process is a viable option for private firms looking to the public capital 
markets. This is essential for firms that have no intensive funding demands and need 
increased liquidity (LoSardo and Zhu, 2012). They found that IPOs and RTs have an 
inverse relationship, suggesting that RTs are used in some cases instead of an IPO, as 
an alternative method to go public. “While most IPOs begin their life on the NYSE, 
AMEX, or NASDAQ, most RTs begin trading on the OTC Bulletin Board or as “Pink 
Sheet” stocks. Therefore, IPO firms are not an ideal benchmark by which to evaluate 
the aftermarket performance of RT firms”, (Lee, et al, 2013). In this study, Lee et al. 
(2013), examine the earnings quality of the firms that chose to go public through RT 
process in the U.S. stock exchange in contrast with the earnings quality of firms that 
chose the IPO process. Emphasis was given to the firms originated from China. One 
of the most important conclusions was that the RT firms engage in more earnings 
management than the IPO firms and generally the non-RT firms. 
Siegel and Wang (2013) tried to find whether adopting U.S. institutions leads to a 
high uniform level of corporate governance and concluded that when choosing the 
RT rout, the rules of the SEC and the Big Four auditors must be followed in order to 
allow a company to go public. On the other hand, if Nevada’s laws are followed 
instead, there is evidence of negative corporate governance and bad economic 
outcomes. Lee, Li and Zhang (2013) stated that there is a difference when it comes 
to RTs in the US and Europe and RTs in China. Usually, RTs are small firms that trade 
over-the-counter (OTC) and most of the times are early-stage companies. The 
Chinese RTs on the other hand, are mature companies and less speculative. Despite 
the fact that most of the Chinese firms that chose RTs have been accused of 
accounting fraud, they outperform their peers in the US. Darrough and Huang 
(2013), on the other hand, suggested that Chinese RTs are lower quality in various 
aspects, such as profitability and accounting quality when compared to Chinese IPOs.  
Chen et al. (2013) investigated a sample of 193 Chinese firms that trade on the major 
stock exchanges in order to explain the reasons that Chinese RTs have lower financial 
reporting quality compared to US RTs and Chinese ADR (American Depository 
Receipt) as well. The results showed that this low quality in financial reporting comes 
from the weak legal enforcement over Chinese firms and the joint effect of the less 
scrutinized RT process. Another conclusion was that Chinese companies that have 
weak bonding incentives and lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity choose the 
RT process.  
Givory et al. (2014) tested a sample of public companies which were formed via a 
reverse merger. The main conclusion was that the reporting quality of those firms, 
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regardless of the country of origin, is lower than that of their domestic industry 
peers and foreign cross-listed companies. On the other hand, the evidence is less 
convincing regarding the alleged inferior quality of foreign RM firms and that of RM 
firms originating in the U.S. Zhu et al. (2014), tested whether geographical location, 
audit quality and equity offering play a role in the earnings quality of RT firms. They 
concluded that firm characteristics are more important and indicative to manage 
earnings than geographical location, which was the popular view until then. 
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Chapter 3 
Reverse Takeovers 
 
3.1 The Reverse Takeover Process 
The Reverse Takeover is a process that allows a private company to go public 
without choosing the time and money consuming IPO process. The process for a RT 
is very simple and very practical for many companies that wish to go public. A 
privately held company, which is the target, is acquired by a publicly held company, 
also known as shell company or vehicle company, usually one that is almost defunct 
or a non-operating shell (Dasilas et.al. 2009).Initially, the shareholders of the private 
company buy enough shares to control a publicly traded company. Then, they 
exchange the shares with the shares of the publicly traded company in order the 
private company to become a publicly traded one. In most RTs the shareholders of 
the private firm hold a huge portion of the shares of the publicly traded company, 
which most of the times reaches 90% of the shares. After this transaction, the 
combined company which is formed by the takeover, is owned by the private 
company and most of the times it changes its name to take the owners. Usually, the 
management of the private company replaces the management of the new entity 
formed after the takeover, and from that time the target company can raise capital 
through markets (Gleason et. al., 2008). 
The decision for the appropriate shell company that will be used as a vehicle for the 
private one in order to go public is usually undertaken by consulting firms, which 
provide any additional information needed. In some cases, small investments 
banking outfits or clearinghouses are hired to handle the transaction completely 
(Gleason et al., 2005). According to Brenner and Schroff (2004), when the shell 
company is detected, the management of the private firm contacts the shell’s 
management in order to find out whether they are interested in taking part in the 
takeover and agree on further details. The typical process takes from one month to 
six, which is a very short period compared to what is needed for an IPO in order to 
be completed. 
Evidence has shown that the scrutiny of the SEC is less when compared to the IPO 
process. Even though the companies that are involved in the RT process are required 
to provide financial statements within two weeks that the transaction takes place, 
most of the companies declare an “inability to file” form indicating  the difficulties of 
obtaining a comprehensive set of financial statements so soon after the merger 
(Gleason et al., 2005). 
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The following diagram is a summary of the RT process: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ojha et al. (2013) 
A reverse takeover is an attractive strategic option for the private companies to gain 
public company status. It is less time-consuming and less expensive alternative 
method than the popular IPO. With a public company status, the private company 
can enjoy greater flexibility in terms of financing sources, and the company's 
investors can also enjoy greater liquidity as well. The management of a private 
company that wishes to go public, however, should be aware of the additional 
obligations faced by the public status and ensure that in order to grow and take 
advantage of the opportunities given by the public listing, sufficient efforts are 
devoted. It will be after all a company with strong prospects and will attract the 
analysts’ attention as well as the interest and attention of new investors. All these 
elements together can increase the value of the stock and its liquidity for 
shareholders and prove that RT was indeed the best option for the company and for 
the shareholders. 
A private company works with a 
shell promoter to locate a shell 
company instead of hiring an 
underwriter in order to market and 
sell its shares in an IPO. 
The next step is the merger of the 
private company with the shell 
company, or a subsidiary of the 
shell company created for that 
purpose.  
After the merger, there is an 
exchange of shares, ending with the 
shareholders of the private 
company owning 85%-95% of the 
merged company whereas the rest 
is owned by the shareholders of the 
shell company.  
The shell company contains the 
assets and liabilities of the operating 
company and is controlled by the 
former operating company 
shareholders. (Ojha et al., 2013) 
The name of the shell company 
usually changes to the name of the 
private company, the target. The 
management of the private company 
replace the former management. 
The shares of the new entity 
continue trading to the same stock 
market before the merger. 
The private company is now a 
public listed company 
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3.2 The regulation  
 One of the two entities that take part in the Reverse Takeover transaction is the 
publicly held company, which is known as the shell company. Usually these types of 
companies are companies without active business operations or significant assets. 
These companies sometimes are established only for the purpose of merging with 
another company or to act as tax avoidance for legitimate companies. The shell 
companies are legal entities, however, they are usually connected to fraud, stock 
price manipulation and are known to be used in black or gray market activities. 
That’s the reason why the RT process rules are getting tighter over time. Even 
though RTs are considered to be fraud cases, some legitimate transactions have 
taken places over time having used the SEC rule 419, which is designed to protect 
the shareholders from fraud in reverse takeover transactions, (Feldman, 2006). This 
rule significantly helped to decrease fraud and not legitimate reverse merger 
transactions. With new rules published in “Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F 
by Shell Companies,” private companies transacting with public shells now have to 
produce a major filing within four days of closing prices, as well as adhere to other 
minor changes in rules, LoSardo and Zhu (2012).  
In Korea, for example, after 2006 reverse takeover companies had to meet the 
criteria of KOSDAQ listing standards, where the minimum requirements are equity of 
at least 3 billion won and a minimum of 10% ROE, (Song et al., 2014). The Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) have made various changes in order to tighten the Listing 
Rules concerned the Reverse Takeover process in 2012. The following are relevant 
indicators. 
 The extent to which the transaction will change the strategic direction or 
nature of the issuer’s business;  
 Whether the issuer’s business will be part of a different industry sector 
following completion of the transaction; or   
 Whether the issuer’s business will deal with fundamentally different suppliers 
or end users (Linklaters, 2012). 
When it comes to RT rules, many stock exchanges have tried to renew them and 
keep them tight enough in order to avoid fraud cases. A recent example is the 
Toronto stock exchange which announced on the 25th of October 2014 new rules 
which allow for a more formal and structured review process regarding the resulting 
capitalization structure, exchange ratios, dilution, size, industry, and post transaction 
leadership. 
The majority of the reverse takeovers we are examining in our study are Australian 
companies so it would be helpful to examine the rules that are imposed by the 
Australian Regulatory Authorities. According to ASX listing rules (Australian Stock 
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Exchange), being party to a back door listing, such as an RT process, will usually 
involve a significant change to the scale of a listed entity’s activities and any 
accompanying issue of securities will often be significantly dilutive to existing 
security holders. ASX considers this to be a factor that warrants the imposition of a 
requirement under Listing Rule 11.1.2 that the transaction be approved by security 
holders. Furthermore a back door listing will usually involves a significant change to 
the nature of the listed entity’s activities or result in a significant change to the listed 
entity’s board of directors, with representatives of the vendor(s) being appointed to 
the board. In either case where that is so, ASX considers this to be a further factor 
that warrants the imposition of a requirement under Listing Rule 11.1.2 that the 
transaction be approved by security holders. ASX will invariably exercise its 
discretion under Listing Rule 11.1.3 to require a listed entity that facilitates a back 
door listing to re-comply with the admission requirements. This is on the principle 
that a person seeking to have an undertaking listed should not be able to achieve by 
the back door what they cannot achieve by the front door, (official ASX web page, 
2015). These are the main rules taken into consideration when a back door listing 
occurs and the same rules seem to be followed by the New Zealand’s stock 
exchange. 
3.3 Going Public 
Reverse Takeovers are considered to be a merger. In strategic management there 
are two aspects that a company can follow in order expand without subsidiaries, 
child entities or joint ventures. Mergers are usually undertaken by firms in order to 
grow and profit from synergy effects (Dasilas et al., 2009). Reverse Takeovers are 
considered to be an ideal vehicle for the companies that wish to expand their 
operations and profit from any synergies. Such synergies could be the case where 
two companies of the same industry can take advantage of the economies of scale, 
after the merger.  Other advantages for the companies that choose this road such is 
the easier access to capital, the greater liquidity, the ability to grow through 
acquisitions or strategic partnerships, the ability to use stock options to attract 
senior executives and retain them as well, and the increased shareholder conﬁdence 
in management (Feldman, 2007). The fraud cases, the public disclosure, the 
significant costs are some of the drawbacks that a company has to take into 
consideration when going public 
3.4 The Australian case 
Reverse Takeovers and backdoor listing, in general, are very popular procedures in 
Australia as there are plenty of listed shell companies on the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX). Unfortunately, even though our initial sample with all completed 
RTs in the Australian and New Zealand region was approximately 175, due to missing 
data we formed a sample of 47 RTs.  The ASX has been dominated by the mining 
sector, with a large number of junior exploration companies. Given the riskiness of 
their endeavors and the cyclical nature of the mining sector, it is not unusual to 
witness a fair proportion of these firms facing financial distress when their funding 
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dries up (Brown et al., 2010). These companies, which face distress, appear to be the 
ideal candidates for being a shell for backdoor listing. In his research, Sjostrom 
(2008) argued that IPOs and RTs are not comparable methods for a firm to go public 
when it comes to capital raising and liquidity. However, Brown et al. (2010) showed 
through their research that the sample with the Australian RTs they tested, 
represent almost an 80 percent of the cases where the capital raisings are present. 
Thus they concluded that Australian RT firms are closer substitutes for IPOs than 
their U.S. or Canadian counterparts. The Australian market would, therefore, be an 
interesting laboratory to examine the motivations of private companies to go public 
through RTs. 
 
 
 
SWOT analysis for the two alternative methods to go public 
Reverse Mergers SWOT analysis 
Strengths 
1. Cheaper than IPOs 
2. Time effective 
3. Simple procedure to go public 
4. No initial listing requirements 
5. Separates the listing process 
and the fundraising 
Weaknesses 
1. No underwriter certification  
2. Weak initial trading 
3. Complicated or illegal shell 
companies 
4. Auditing conflicts 
5. May not be noticed by 
investors 
Opportunities 
1. Tax benefits 
2. Growth opportunities 
3. PIPE financing 
4. More choices and alternatives 
to raise money 
Threats 
1. Risk to damage the reputation 
of the firm 
2. Company’s stock might trade at 
discount due to uneven 
information 
3. Probability of reverse stock 
split 
4. Default or fraud cases 
Source: Ojha et.al. (2013) 
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IPO SWOT analysis 
Source : Loshardo and Zhu (2012) 
 
3.3.3 An Australian RT example 
Several notable examples of Reverse mergers have taken place in recent years: 
1. US Airways and America West Airlines  (27th of September, 2005) 
2. New York Stock Exchange and Archipelago Holdings ( 27th of February, 2006) 
3. Stobart Group and Westbury Property Fund (15th of August, 2007) 
But since we are investigating the Australian market, it would be useful to examine 
an RT in Australia. 
The case of Cocoon and Prime Minerals. (Source: businessinsider.com) 
Cocoon Data, a software security startup company, and Covata trading entities 
completed a merger with the shell company Prime Minerals, listed in the ASX, in 
November 2014. After the merger the company altered its name to Covata and $15 
million were raised. With a total market cap of $74 million, Covata was one of the 
biggest RTOs that year. According to its management, the company was looking to 
raise a minimum of $2.5 million. 
Before the RT, Cocoon was posting huge losses: In 2012 the company reported a 
total loss of more than $11.1 million, in 2013 that number was $8.376 million and in 
June 2014 a loss of $9.769 million. This is because high tech technologies are known 
to make huge losses in the early stage of their product development. 
Cocoon Data managed to agree a reverse takeover with the mining company, Prime 
Minerals a binding for AU$ 57 million on May 2014. Under the terms of the Bid 
Implementation Agreement, Prime Minerals acquired 100 percent of issued Cocoon 
Strengths 
1. Gain prestige 
2. Shareholders’ equity increases 
3. Company’s public exposure 
increases-name recognition 
Weaknesses 
1. Expensive procedure 
2. Time consuming  
3. File many documents 
4. Direct fees to investment 
banks and lawyers 
Opportunities 
1. Raise capital 
2. Pay down debt 
3. Increase liquidity 
 
Threats 
1. May be affected by capital 
markets 
2. Stock dilution 
3. Stock sale lock-up period for 
insiders 
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shares via the reverse takeover offer, with Cocoon shareholders offering total non-
cash consideration of AU$ 57,281,673. Also, the Cocoon option-holders replaced 
their existing 28,825,000 Cocoon options with existing Prime options. 
After the merger, the company managed to close several agreements with 
companies such as NSC Global Services and Verizon Australia, enhancing more its 
market profile and its market credibility. This merger helped Covata grow more 
aggressively and pursue new opportunities around the world. 
In its first day in the ASX, Covata’s shares traded at 20 cents per share. 
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Chapter 4 
Data and descriptive statistics 
4.1 Data Sources 
The purpose of this study is to examine the wealth effects of reverse takeovers that 
took place in Australia and New Zealand between 1993 and 2014. The sample was 
formed by applying the following criteria: 1) Both acquirers and targets should be 
located in Australia and New Zealand. 2) The transaction of RTs must be completed. 
By imposing these criteria, the Thomson One database, gave us an initial sample of 
353 reverse takeovers. After eliminating all RT transactions that were not completed 
and all with missing data, which in our case were a lot, we ended up in a final sample 
of 47 RT deals which is not a big sample, however, we will allow us to make the 
appropriate inferences. Fundamentals and stock prices were derived from 
Bloomberg Database and Thomson One as well. 
Table 1: Distribution of reverse takeovers announcements in Australia and New 
Zealand 1993-2014. 
Year of 
announcement   Number of RTs 
 
Percentage 
1993 
  
2 
  
4.26 
1994 
  
2 
  
4.26 
1997 
  
5 
  
10.64 
1998 
  
4 
  
8.51 
2001 
  
2 
  
4.26 
2004 
  
1 
  
2.13 
2005 
  
1 
  
2.13 
2007 
  
3 
  
6.38 
2008 
  
4 
  
8.51 
2009 
  
2 
  
4.26 
2010 
  
4 
  
8.51 
2011 
  
5 
  
10.64 
2012 
  
3 
  
6.38 
2013 
  
3 
  
6.38 
2014 
  
6 
  
12.77 
Total 
 
  47 
  
100 
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Figure 1: Reverse Takeovers in Australia and New Zealand (1993-2014) 
 
 
The reverse takeover mechanism grows in popularity between the years 1993 and 
1998 while more firms later choose RTs as a means of going public. Between 2001 
and 2005, the number of RTs decline and then increases again even when the global 
financial crisis started (2008). One reason that might explain the decline of RTs in 
2001 is the tech/dotcom bubble burst in 2001, which affected the IPO market and 
probably the RT market as well. 
It is important to mention that most of the firms we examine, public and private, that 
are involved in the RT process come from a wide range of industries with good 
growth opportunities. The most popular view that holds for RTs is that this market 
consists of small private firms in speculative sectors merging with failing public firms 
in low growth opportunity industries (Gleason et al., 2005). The sectors of the 
companies that we examine are the following: 
industry 
 
No. 
1.      Consumer  products and services 
 
4 
2.      Consumer staples 
 
1 
3.      Energy and power 
 
6 
4.      Financials 
 
2 
5.      Healthcare 
 
4 
6.      High technology 
 
5 
7.      Industrials 
 
17 
8.      Materials 
 
4 
9.      Media and entertainment 
 
2 
10.  Real estate 
 
1 
11.  Retail 
 
1 
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Chapter 5 
Methodology 
We used the classical event study methodology in order to measure the stock price 
reaction to the announcement of a reverse takeover. What the current study examines 
is whether the announcement of a RT affects the stock price of the public firm and 
creates value for the shareholders of the company. The classical event study 
methodology is considered to be the most popular method in order to test market 
efficiency and gauge the wealth effects of corporate events such as RTs. 
The market model and market adjusted model are employed as return-generating 
models. With the market-adjusted model the ex-ante expected return on a stock is 
constant across stocks and can differ across time (Sudarsanam, 2010). The expected 
return for stock i in time t is given by:      (1) 
The equation for the market model is: E(Rit)=ai +bi RMt                                  (2) 
In order to estimate the parameters ai and bi we use the Scholes and Williams (1977) 
technique which takes into account the thin trading problem which is a very 
common situation of shell companies, where the transactions are less so the prices 
are more volatile and the assets less liquid. The equation for bi is: 
 
where S1 is the beta of the share and Index’ closing prices, S2 is the beta of the share 
and the Index’ closing prices leaving out the first day prices of the share and the last 
day prices of the Index, S3 is the beta is the same as before but now we eliminate the 
last day price of the share and the first day price of the index and M1 indicates the 
correlation between the share and the Index prices. The parameters for the market 
model, where we estimated the mean and the standard deviation, are estimated by 
regressing the stock returns on the market return for the estimation period that 
ranges from t-250 to t-11 where t=0 is the announcement date.  
The difference between the actual return and the expected return on the security are 
the abnormal returns and the equation is: ARit=Rit – E(Rit)     (3) 
In the above equation, ARit is the abnormal return, Rit is the realized return and E(𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
is the expected return on security i for the t period. 
With a combination of equations (1) and (3), we conclude that the abnormal returns 
based on the market-adjusted model are calculated as follows: 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡=𝑅𝑖𝑡−RM𝑡       (4) 
The abnormal returns based on the market model, are calculated by combining 
equations (2) and (3): 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡=𝑅𝑖𝑡−(𝑎𝑖+𝑏𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡)      (5) 
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Now, by combining equations (4) and (5) we are able to calculate the abnormal 
returns of one security. In order to calculate the abnormal returns of the sample, we 
use the formula of Average Abnormal Return (AAR):  𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡=∑Ni=1    (6) 
Where N is the number of stocks involved in a RT. 
After calculating the abnormal returns based on the two models, we calculate the 
cumulative abnormal returns which are the sum of the abnormal returns for a specific 
period T. The formula is:  CARit=Σ
T
t=1ARit                  (7) 
The Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are computed for the following event 
periods: (10,10), (-10,-1), (+1,+10), (-5,+5), (-5,-1), (+1,+5), (-1,+1) and (-1,0). We 
compute CARs prior and post-RTs in order to capture possible information leakages 
or slow market reaction and check for market efficiency. We also calculate abnormal 
volatility, based on the market model. Following Landsman and Maydew (2002), we 
estimate abnormal volatility (AVAR) as follows: AVARit=    (8) 
AR
2
it is the squared abnormal return that is calculated by the market model and σi
2
 is 
the variance of the company’s market model returns which are calculated during the 
estimation period from t-250 to t-11. It is widely known that abnormal volatility takes 
only positive values. When this value is below the unity, there is a reduction in 
volatility, while a value above unity, implies an increase in volatility during the 
specific period. 
5.1 Multivariate Regression  
Going deeper into the valuation effects of RTs, we used pooled cross-sectional 
regression analysis having CARs of three days (-1, 1) as dependent variable. As 
independent variables we use the logarithm of Total Assets (size), Return on Assets 
(ROA) Return on Equity (ROE), the Cash to Asset ratio and year dummies. We base 
the selection of the variables on prior studies investigating RTs (for example, Gleason 
et al., 2005a). In both regressions we checked for multicollinearity by looking at the 
correlation matrix. We did not find any correlated pairs among variables.  
 
5.2 Long Term Performance 
Moreover, we evaluate the long-term performance of RTs examined in this study. To 
be more specific, we used a number of financial ratios for the year in which the event 
took place as well as for the year after the event. The reason why we opted this 
technique is to find out whether there is an improvement in the financial performance 
of the RTs firms after the event took place. We calculated, mean, median, maximum, 
minimum and standard deviation of the ratios, in order to have a more general view of 
the sample and then we performed test of equality in order to go dipper into our 
analysis and be more specific to our conclusions. 
25 
 
Chapter 6 
Empirical Results 
6.1 Stock price reaction to RT event 
In Table 2 we indicate the average abnormal returns of our sample stocks for the 20 
days surrounding the event of the RT process (day 0). Using the market model, our 
results show significant abnormal returns in day 0 and day 2 as well, which means 
that the shareholders receive significant price appreciations and depreciations 
respectively, as in day 2 we have negative results.  In the market adjusted model on 
the other hand, we have abnormal returns in the day prior to the event and seven 
days (day -7) prior to the event. The results should be interpreted carefully because 
of the small sample size. These results indicate that the investors react with 
consciousness and slow enough in an announcement of RT since we have abnormal 
returns after the event. In previous studies, see Gleason et al. (2005), the reaction of 
the investors is quick and we do not observe abnormal returns after the 
announcement day but we observe significant positive returns in the 10-day period 
prior to the event. In this case, the shareholders see the opportunity given to them 
to gain back the investment they lost due to investing in distressed companies. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal returns around RT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  market model 
  
market adjusted model 
  CARs % t-Statistic 
 
CARs % t-Statistic 
CAR (-10 -1)    6.11%* 1.67 
 
      0.064*** 2.67 
CAR (+1 +10) -5.25% -1.43 
 
-0.058* -1.95 
CAR (-5 -1) 3.38% 1.30 
 
0.037 1.94 
CAR (+1 +5) -4.88%* -1.88 
 
      -0.044*** -2.20 
CAR (-1 +1)       5.40%*** 2.69 
 
0.052 1.14 
CAR (-1 0)       6.32%*** 3.85 
 
       0.061*** 2.32 
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Table 3 : Cumulative abnormal returns around the RT 
  market model 
 
market-adjusted model 
Days AAR (%) T-statistic 
 
AAR (%) T-statistic 
-10 0.708 0.61 
 
0.844 1.45 
-9 0.213 0.18 
 
-0.016 -0.02 
-8 0.330 0.28 
 
0.303 0.44 
-7 1.474 1.27 
 
     1.707** 2.66 
-6 0.005 0.00 
 
-0.099 -0.13 
-5 -0.442 -0.38 
 
-0.059 -0.12 
-4 -0.022 -0.02 
 
0.085 0.11 
-3 0.142 0.12 
 
0.360 0.35 
-2 1.786 1.54 
 
1.544 1.30 
-1 1.919 1.65 
 
     1.733** 2.08 
0 
       
4.401*** 3.80 
 
4.357 1.52 
 
1 -0.919 -0.79 
 
-0.892 -0.70 
2      -1.988* -1.71 
 
-1.897 -1.47 
3 -1.798 -1.55 
 
-1.521 -1.38 
4 -0.658 -0.57 
 
-0.51 -0.28 
5 0.482 0.42 
 
0.401 0.52 
6 -1.291 -1.11 
 
-1.479 -1.02 
7 -0.770 -0.66 
 
-1.071 -1.15 
8 0.978 0.84 
 
0.900 0.97 
9 0.667 0.58 
 
0.447 0.42 
10 0.046 0.04   -0.222 -0.31 
Note: * indicates a significant difference from zero at the 10% level. ** indicates a significant 
difference from zero at the 5% level and *** indicates a significant difference from zero at the 1% 
level. 
 
Table 3 presents the cumulative abnormal returns that surround the RT process. As 
we can see, we have statistically significant results that range from 1.67 to 3.85 and 
2.67 to 2.32 in the market model and market adjusted respectively, which indicate 
that the RT is a process that increases the wealth of the shareholders of the shell 
companies involved in the process. Comparing our results with previous studies, we 
observe that there are positive abnormal returns on days -3 -2 and -1, (Gleason et 
al., 2005b). The most possible explanation that could be given, is that the 
shareholders of the shell companies, which are in distress as we have already 
mentioned, perceive that RTs are a big opportunity in order to recover or gain back 
their losses from investing in such distressed companies. Brown et al. (2002) also 
find that the returns on the event day are significantly positive. 
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6.2Multivariate Regression 
In the two regressions of table 4 and table 5, we indicate the results from the 
multivariate regressions of 3-days cumulative abnormal returns. Our dependent 
variables are the logarithm of Total Assets, which refers to the size of the company, 
the ROA which measures the profitability of the firm and year-dummy variables. As 
we can see, the CAR regression has better results as the size of the firm and the ROA 
are statistically significant. The coefficient for the size is -0.083 which could be 
interpreted as the higher the company size, the lower the cumulative abnormal 
returns that are generated on the announcement of an RT. On the other hand, small 
firms are characterized by large cumulative abnormal returns. The coefficient for 
ROA is 2.13 which indicates that when the profitability of the company is high, the 
cumulative abnormal returns generated on an RT announcement are low. Inversely, 
we can state that when the company is not profitable enough, the cumulative 
abnormal returns generated on the announcement day are significantly high. 
Table 4: Multivariate regression of 3-day(-1,1) cumulative abnormal returns. 
  AR0 
  
CAR (-1,1) 
 Constant 0.301 0.94 
 
0.169 1.33 
ROA 0.005 0.57 
 
   0.001** 2.13 
Beta -0.036 0.79 
 
0.008 -0.34 
Logsize -0,087 -1.11 
 
-0.083* 1.82 
Year Dummies  Yes 
  
Yes 
 F statistic 0.421 
  
0.838 
 No 47 
  
47 
 Note: * indicates a significant difference from zero at the 10% level. ** indicates a significant 
difference from zero at the 5% level and *** indicates a significant difference from zero at 
the 1% level. 
 
In order to reach safer and secure conclusions about our research, we decided to run 
two more regressions, this time eliminating the ROA and the year dummy variables 
and adding the Cash to Total Assets ratio which measures the liquidity of the firm 
and the ROE as well which is similar to the ROA ratio we used before. The results 
seem to have improved in the AR regression where we have a statistically significant 
F-statistic meaning that this model explains all the variables. Furthermore, the Size 
of the firm is significant in the AR0 model with a coefficient of -2.66, meaning that 
the higher the company size, the lower the cumulative abnormal returns that are 
generated on the announcement of an RT, as interpreted in the previous regression.  
In the CAR regression, the results seem to have worsened a little since the only 
statistically significant variable is the beta.  
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Table 5: Multivariate regression of 3-day(-1,1) cumulative abnormal returns. 
             AR0       CAR (-1,1)   
Constant 0.149 2.91 
 
0.155 0.96 
ROE -0.001 0.80 
 
-0.073 1.25 
Cash -0.001 0.54 
 
-0.0003 0.47 
Beta 0.008 0.67 
 
 0.036* 1.89 
Logsize        -0.058* -2.66 
 
  0.0032 1.02 
Year Dummies                No 
  
         No 
 F statistic 1.92* 
  
  0.715 
 No            47            47   
Note: * indicates a significant difference from zero at the 10% level. ** indicates a significant 
difference from zero at the 5% level and *** indicates a significant difference from zero at the 1% 
level. 
Most of the public firms (shell companies) of our sample that participated in a 
reverse takeover transaction are firms with small capitalization, known as penny 
stocks or shell companies. Most of the shares that we examine are undervalued, and 
that is because of information asymmetry. Small firms, like the ones that we 
examine, are not followed by analysts and cannot provide the public with all the 
information needed. As Aydoglou et al. (2007) state, the firm size is negatively 
related to information asymmetry and thus, small firms are also highly information 
asymmetric. So the negative relationship between the size of the firm and the 
cumulative abnormal returns is explained by the above theory. The large abnormal 
returns of the shell company’s stock are generated because the announcement of 
the reverse merger transaction attracts public’s interest and the stock becomes 
more liquid and all relevant information is incorporated in the stock price (Andres et 
al., 2007). So, after these facts have taken place the stock begins to trade at higher 
prices and at some point, it is traded in its fair value. 
6.3 Financial Performance 
In this section we investigate the financial performance of the new entities that were 
formed after the RT. We performed test of equality in means and medians of the 
fundamentals surrounding the event. That is the only way to have a clear view of the 
ratios and whether they do change. Table 8 indicates the results from the test. 
Looking at Total Assets, which indicate the firm size, we observe a significant 
increase. That means that the firm size of the new entity increases after the merger. 
As we can see from the p-values in table 8, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
having no change between the year of the event and a year after for the Cash to 
Total Assets Ratio, The Return on Assets and the Return on Equity as well, but there 
is a slightly improvement to their values. On the other hand, there is a statistically 
significant difference in Debt to Total Assets ratio. That can be a sign that the long-
term and short-term debt of these companies’ increases even more, maybe because 
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of expansion efforts. Nevertheless, our sample was quite small and that fact may 
manipulated the results. 
The fact that there is no change in the ratios of Return on Assets, Return on Equity 
and the Total Asset ratio, indicate that these firms, even after the merger, are not 
very profitable. Return on Assets is a measure of how efficient the management uses 
the Total Assets of the company to generate profits. Return on Equity is a similar 
ratio of profitability, indicating how much profit is generated from every unit of 
shareholders equity. Cash to Total Assets is an indicator of liquidity and in our 
sample it seems that it gets better after the RT. But still, we are conscious about the 
results and very careful because we have a small sample which does not allow us to 
have clear and safe estimations. We also observe a decline in the number of 
observations being examined, which means that some companies, even after the 
merger, did not survive even after the merger. That is the case for many companies 
which do not have the capability to go public and when merging with a distressed 
company, the situation worsens.  
 
Table 6: Public companied in the year of RT. 
  No Mean Median 
  
Maximum  Minimum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets(in thousands of Euros) 41 318.86 26.7 5053.5 0.1 
      
878.25 
ROA% 41 35.44 10.16 306.97 0 60.26 
ROE% 30 48.34 13.765 391.28 0.67 81.74 
Cash to Total Assets % 35 4.06 1.1 53.4 0 10.03 
Debt to Total Assets % 31 26.481 25.1 87.6 0 27.46 
 
Table 7 : Public companies one year after the event 
 
 
 
 
  
 No Mean Median Maximum  Minimum        
 Standard            
Deviation  
Total Assets(in thousands of Euros) 31 1758.07 52 35908 1.8  6510.11 
ROA% 27 26.29 9.06 262.26 0.42      51.43 
ROE% 27 77.39 19.2 589.88 0.47    151.32 
Cash to Total Assets % 25 3.81 1.2 32.4 0      7.059 
Debt to Total Assets % 29 24.258 23.1 80.6 0      24.90 
30 
 
Table 8: Mean and Medians of fundamentals around the event 
 
Panel A: 
 Cash to Total Assets 
    Years 0 1     Period (0.+1) 
Mean            3.81            4.06     Change 0.25 
Median              1.1              1.2     P value 0.99 
> Overall median               13 15     Wilcoxon P-value 0.982 
N              25 35     
 
Panel B: 
Debt to Total Assets 
    Years 0 1          Period (0.+1) 
Mean      1758.07        2425.8          Change 667.73 
Median            23.1          52.00          P value 0.098* 
> Overall median  9 21         Wilcoxon P-value 3.72 
N 29 31     
  
Panel C:  
Return on Assets 
    Years 0 1                Period (0.+1) 
Mean          26.29         35.54                Change 9.25 
Median            9.06         10.16                P value 0.51 
> Overall median  13 21        Wilcoxon P-value 0.006 
N 27 41     
 
Panel D: 
Return on Equity 
    Years 0 1                 Period (0.+1) 
Mean          48.34          77.39                 Change 29.05 
Median            19.2          13.76                 P value 0.37 
> Overall median  14 14        Wilcoxon P-value 1.15 
 N 27 30     
Note: * indicates a significant difference from zero at the 10% level. ** indicates a significant 
difference from zero at the 5% level and *** indicates a significant difference from zero at the 1% 
level. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
A reverse Takeover is a mechanism for companies in order to go public without an 
IPO and it seems to gain more reputation the last decades because it is considered a 
more “easy” access to the public listing. The process of an RT is when a private 
company, the target, is acquired by a public company, a shell company, in order to 
obtain its public listing. The new entity usually operates under the management and 
the name of the former private company, as that is the actual aggressors that start the 
negotiations for a Reverse Takeover. 
Even though Reverse Takeover grow in popularity with a fast pace, little research has 
been done in order to examine this topic, leaving many gaps to be explored in the 
future. In this study, we tried to analyze the wealth effects of the RT process in 
Australia and New Zealand as well. This region has experienced an unprecedented 
wave if RTs but still, no research has been conducted, so we try to fill the gap.  
Our results demonstrate that even though RT is considered to be an alternative to the 
IPO, the companies that choose the one or the other path usually have different 
characteristics, with the smaller and non-profitable ones choosing the RT method. 
Still, the two different methods have similar characteristics, follow similar paths and 
are affected by similar events. Furthermore, in both cases the private firms come from 
a wide range of industries with good growth opportunities opting for expansion. In the 
RT case, the public companies because they are in distress, they get involved in a 
reverse merger in order to improve their performance and continue to exist.  
The empirical results of our study indicate that a Reverse Takeover process is a 
process which generates statistically significant abnormal returns around the 
announcement of the event. Specifically, we found abnormal returns, positive and 
negative, not only the days prior to the event announcement but also, two days after 
the announcement. That can be explained by the fact that some investors are 
suspicious in such transactions or by the fact that there is information asymmetry not 
allowing the investors and the analysts as well to be more realistic and see the 
opportunities generated by a reverse takeover.  In previous studies, the most common 
outcome is when there are abnormal returns until the day of announcement, which 
shows that the shareholders react quickly in such big events and try to recover their 
losses from investments in distressed companies. The coefficients of the regression 
we run showed that the bigger the size of the company, the lower the cumulative 
abnormal returns surrounding the event. The profitability ratios (return on assets and 
return on equity) show that there is an inverse relationship between the abnormal 
returns too, meaning that when the profitability of the company is high, the abnormal 
returns are lower. We were very conscious about the results because our sample was 
smaller than the expected, due to data unavailability. We went deeper into analyzing 
the financial performance of the new public companies after the RT and the 
conclusions were interesting enough. The equality test we performed showed that 
even though the size of the new entity gets bigger, this fact is not accompanied with 
greater profits. That means that these companies cannot generate profit in their early 
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stages even though they have gone bigger. On the other hand, the debt that the 
companies owe gets bigger and that could be a sign of growth and expansion which 
accompanies the fact that the size of the frim gets bigger after the merger. 
We reached a very good point in the analysis of the wealth effects in the Australian 
and New Zealand region by showing that an announcement of a reverse merger 
generates abnormal returns and investors seem to react sooner or later in such big 
events. These abnormal returns can increase the wealth of the shareholders when their 
reaction is quick relatively to the date of the announcement, which means that they 
see the opportunity given to them to gain back their losses from their investment to 
shell companies. We can also consider these abnormal returns as a compensation for 
the risk undertaken. On the other hand we are not sure yet whether someone should 
invest in such firms, even after the merger, when it is widely known that most of the 
times they go public in order to take advantage of these abnormal returns. Further 
investigation should be done in order to explain all the matters that surround the 
interesting yet unknown case of reverse takeovers such as how to maintain a good 
long term performance and how to alleviate the risk that accompanies RTs.  
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